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Abstract: World governance today is characterized by international organizations
lacking democratic legitimacy and control by the citizens they claim to represent. They
are also criticized for being inefficient. This leads to violent protests and to NGOs having
great influence. To address these problems, we propose international governance based
on the democratic idea of citizen participation: All citizens of the member countries of
international organizations have the potential right to participate in the decision-making
of international organizations via initiatives, referendums and recalls. In order to reduce
transaction costs, a representative group of citizens is randomly selected who can actually
exercise their participation rights. (101 words)
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2I. Problems With Global Governance
Many of the institutions in the area of global governance are confronted time and again
with violent protests. In particular, the meetings of international organizations, such as
the IMF, the WTO and the World Bank, or of private organizations, such as the World
Economic Forum, are attacked heavily by large scale and violent protests. These protests
get substantial coverage by the media; as much time and space is allocated to reporting on
the demonstrations and demonstrators as to the issues under debate at the official
meetings.
The major charge brought against the institutions involved in international governance is
that they favor “unjust” solutions to the world’s problems. The protesters complain about
these institutions’ neglect of the poor and are convinced that globalization raises, rather
than diminishes, the number of people living in poverty1. They also blame these
institutions for neglecting environmental degradation. International organizations have,
moreover, been accused of large-scale inefficiency and waste and of being ineffective in
the sense of not being able to put policies into action or enforce them. Still others
complain about the “democratic deficit” of international organizations and deny the
legitimacy of many representatives of the so-called global civil society involved in
international governance. Rather than reflecting “world opinion”, they represent the
specific interests of the donors who fund the NGOs’ activities.
Several reasons have been found to account for these failures: First, taxpayers of the
nations funding the international organizations (the principals) do not effectively and
sufficiently control the behavior of bureaucrats in international organizations (the agents).
Second, international agreements involve the provision of public goods and thus provide
incentives for free riding. This problem is aggravated because external enforcement of
agreements is very limited between sovereign states. Third, the delegation of
competencies to international organizations and their policy making under current forms
of democracy do not meet adequate procedural conditions that would ensure that people
in member countries feel like empowered citizens with autonomy and influence. Instead,
                                                 
1 Whether this is indeed true is another matter. For the view that globalization is good for the
poor, see e.g. Dollar and Kraay (2004).
3current rules and regulations make international organizations susceptible to the influence
of the governments of single member countries, business interests and NGOs.2
Many solutions have been offered on how to improve global governance and to overcome
the specific problems identified. One solution is to increase transparency so that the
people concerned have a better knowledge of how the various policies proposed, and
actually carried out, are going to affect them. Another solution is to tighten the rules,
standards and criteria under which international institutions act. While these measures are
useful, they are certainly not sufficient to overcome the failures in international
governance already alluded to. A far-reaching proposal would be to establish a World
Government. As it would cover the entire globe, it is considered capable of providing the
global public goods in an optimal way, and reducing, or even preventing, global public
bads. It would also be expected to overcome the inequality existing in today’s world.
But there are major arguments against a global government. In fact, it may not even be
desirable. A global government must, by necessity, be a large bureaucratic organization,
which would, if anything, be even more inefficient and wasteful than the existing
international organizations. But even more importantly, individuals would be totally
dependent on this new government. Persons who did not agree with its policies, or felt
oppressed due to a lack of freedom or too high and unjust taxes, would have no
possibility of escape by migrating elsewhere. “Exit” would thus be impossible, which
would rob dissenting people of an important possibility of making their dissatisfaction
visible to the political decision-makers (Hirschman 1970). The leaders of the global
government would hold unprecedented power in their hands. As has often been remarked,
and rightly so, absolute power corrupts absolutely, and there is no reason why this should
not apply to a global government. However, it is highly unlikely that such a government
will evolve in the foreseeable future, because the nation states dominating the present
                                                 
2 Hewson and Sinclair (1999), Nye and Donahue (2001), Kahler and Lake (2003), Kaul et al.
(2003) and the Commission on Global Governance (1995) provide an extensive list of references
to the literature on globalization, transnational relations, international regimes and international
organizations. On the global civil society, see e.g. Keane (2003) or Glasius et al. (2002). For
recent contributions on global governance, see e.g. Held (1997), Walzer (1998), Barnett and
Finnemore (1999), Pierre (2000), Keohane and Nye (2000), Keohane (2001), Heritier (2002). The
literature in economics is more restricted; see e.g. Vaubel and Willett (1991), Frey and Gygi
(1990, 1991), Frey (1984, 1997d), Schulze and Ursprung (1999) and Rodrik (2000).
4world, in particular the United States, cannot reasonably be expected to relinquish even
small parts of their power in favor of a global government.
We propose a different approach to international and world governance based on the
fundamental democratic idea of citizen participation. While we are convinced that this
proposal would fundamentally change world governance, as it exists today, we would
restrict it to improving the functioning of international organizations3.
Our proposal is based on two basic design elements:
(1) All citizens of all member countries of a particular international organization should
have potential participation rights in international political decision-making.
(2) All citizens should have the same chance of being selected to have actually the
possibility to vote.
The first design element refers to the advantages of democratic decision-making that are
to complement hierarchical decision-making in international organizations. Citizen
participation is put forward as a political right enshrined in the “constitution” of an
international organization. Participation rights would consist of three democratic
instruments: (i) Citizens could propose changes to the ground rules (or constitution) of
the organization. If enough citizens were to sign a popular initiative, the proposal would
have to be put on the voting agenda and would become a binding rule if approved in a
ballot held in all member countries. (ii) Fundamental changes in the ground rules, or
extensions of international agreements, would have to be approved in a mandatory
referendum.4 (iii) Second priority would be given to a further extension of citizen
participation that would include the recall of top bureaucrats in international
organizations. In this proposal, citizens’ participation rights would not include elections.
The appointment of top public officials in international organizations would stay as it is
                                                 
3 But our proposal could also be used beyond international organizations, in particular for new
forms of public governance, such as the establishment of functional, overlapping and competing
jurisdictions (so-called FOCJ). They are discussed briefly in section IV.
4 Alternatively, a referendum could only be held if required by a certain number of citizens or
member countries. Mandatory referendums would, in certain cases, replace ratification by
national parliaments.
5at present. This would allow public discourse to focus more on issues dealing with
content rather than on candidates coming from the “right” nation.
Citizens’ involvement would thus be understood as direct democratic participation. There
is extensive knowledge in political science, law and economics about the working of
direct democracy at the state and federal level.5 While there are international
organizations of a size comparable to that of US States with regard to the population of
its member countries, there are also numerous organizations representing many more
people. Conducting referendums with a citizenry of a billion people is barely manageable
and produces high transaction costs.
We, therefore, propose a second design element that introduces a mechanism to reduce
the number of people who actually get the possibility of participating as voters. This can
be achieved by using the principle of random selection among all the citizens of the
member countries. The term “random” in everyday usage is associated with terms such as
aimless, haphazard, uncertain, or indifferent. Here the word is used, as in statistics, where
a random sample gives each and every member of the population the same probability of
being selected. Random selection thus means that each citizen of a member country in an
international organization has an equal chance of being chosen. He or she is, in this sense,
a precise representative of the underlying aggregate citizenship. The basic democratic
idea is that each person is capable of making a useful contribution to political decision-
making, just as every citizen in a representative democracy has the power to vote,
regardless of his or her income, education, gender, religion or race.
As we envisage the main novelty in the second design element, we focus on the aspect of
random selection.
We expect four improvements as a result of our proposal:
(1) International organizations would allow effective citizen participation in decision-
making on issues of content;
(2) Efficiency would be raised by effectively controlling the executive politicians and
public officials in international organizations.
                                                 
5 For reviews of the literature, see e.g. Bowler and Donovan (1998), Frey and Stutzer (2003),
Gerber and Hug (2001), Kirchgässner et al. (1999) and Matsusaka (2004).
6(3) The influence of special interests in international governance would be weakened
relative to latent groups and would be channeled within the rule of law.
(4) Collective decisions would become more self-enforcing, due to the strengthened
legitimacy of international agreements.
The next section of this paper discusses the institutional design of random selection in
international organizations. Section III lists the advantages and disadvantages of our
proposal. The following section IV compares the random selection of citizens to other
proposals for improving global governance. An application to the United Nations is
briefly discussed in section V. Section VI offers concluding remarks.
II. Basic Idea and Institutional Design
We propose to overcome the insufficient democratic foundation and efficiency of
international organizations by empowering the citizens of the member states to have a say
in the decisions made. In order to deal with the frequently considerable number of
citizens involved, the voting body is reduced to a size allowing voting to proceed in a
manageable manner. This is achieved by selecting a restricted number of persons via a
random mechanism, giving each person the same chance of being chosen. The randomly
selected citizens are given the right to vote on issues of content by means of popular
initiatives and referendums, and by recalling the international organization leaders in case
they disapprove of their performance. These instruments of direct democratic
participation are well known and have been carefully studied in political science, law and
economics. In this paper, we combine them with a mechanism that permits benefiting
from citizen participation, while keeping transaction costs low. As the main novelty of
our proposal lies in the aspect of random selection, this aspect is emphasized in the
following analysis.
7A. Random Selection
Using the random mechanism to select from all citizens those with actual voting rights
represents a constitutional choice6 behind the veil of ignorance between the many
possible social decision-making procedures. The best-known procedures of this kind are
the market, democracy, hierarchy and bargaining, but there are others, such as decisions
made according to tradition (Dahl and Lindblom 1953). The constitutional approach is
procedural or process oriented; it does not consider particular outcomes, but looks at the
way decisions are reached. Decision-making mechanisms are chosen so that, in the long
run, given people’s interests in the current political process, people’s preferences are best
satisfied. Thereby, people have preferences about the process as such and experience
procedural utility beyond the utility from the outcome reached (for a survey, see Frey,
Benz and Stutzer 2004). The procedural good of central importance for democracy is that
ordinary people, rather than a self-selected elite, take the ultimate decisions in
international organizations. Empirical research indeed suggests that the possibility of
participating provides procedural utility, independent of outcome utility7.
The random mechanism suggested here, by definition assigns each citizen an equal
likelihood of being chosen and getting the possibility of voting on issues of content. The
random selection may in practice be undertaken by using any appropriate mechanical
system (such as using lots) or by using computer programs. The underlying population
from which the citizens are selected may be taken from the voting registers of the
countries, which are members of the particular international organization, assuming that
these countries are (at least in a formal sense) democracies.
The random mechanism is rarely used in politics8. In particular, modern democracies
favor elections. But there are many examples where random procedures are used, for
example in games of chance, such as lotteries and roulette, in decisions among friends
                                                 
6 Constitutional choice is extensively discussed in Buchanan and Tullock (1962), Frey (1983),
Brennan and Buchanan (1985), Mueller (1996) and Cooter (2000).
7 The respective econometric analysis has been undertaken using self-reported subjective well-
being data in a cross-section over the 26 cantons of Switzerland, which grant their citizens
unequal political participation possibilities (Frey and Stutzer in press).
8 There is an extensive discussion on the use of the random mechanism in politics. See Elster
(1989, chapter II) and Carson and Martin (1999). They refer to much additional literature.
8when other methods run into problems, in scientific research (e.g. for drug testing or to
decide between competing empirical models) or in admission to university. But random
mechanisms have also been used in the political realm. Firstly, they can be used as a
strategy to make decisions. An important example is conscription for military service. In
the 1970s, the U.S. government, for instance, used a lottery based on birthdays to
determine which men were drafted into the army in order to fight in Vietnam. Draft
lotteries were also used during World Wars I and II, both in the United States and in
several European countries. Every eligible man should have an equal probability of being
chosen.
Secondly, random mechanisms can be used as a strategy to choose decision makers. The
best-known example today is the choice of persons to form a jury in serious criminal
cases, such as murder, but sometimes also in civil cases. Criminal juries are of major
importance in Anglo-Saxon countries, but also exist on the European continent,
especially in Scandinavia. While professional judges are certainly more knowledgeable,
the major reason to randomly select jurors is in order that justice be perceived as fair.
Persons drawn by chance from the whole population are seen to be, on average, more
honest than some professional judges, and to reflect more closely the moral standards of
the population. Moreover, fairness may lie in being heard and judged by ordinary people
drawn from the whole population9.
The past has known important cases in which random selection has been used. Classical
democracy in Athens in the fifth and fourth century B.C., which is still a model for today,
used random selection as a central feature (see e.g. Manin 1997, Hansen 1991, Engelstad
1989). The Assembly, which every one of the between 30,000 and 60,000 citizens could
attend, took the most important decisions. Its business was prepared by the Council of
500 members, composed of 10 groups of 50 members each. Each group was chosen by
lot from one of the ten tribes of Athens. Each group took a turn as the Committee
(prytany), and the order in which this was done was determined by lot. The persons
presiding over the Assembly, the Council and the Committee were chosen by lot on the
day they met. In addition, most public officials were chosen randomly. The only
                                                 
9 In reality, neither the draft nor juries are chosen in a perfectly random way. See Carson and
Martin (1999: 20-21, 26-30), Elster (1989:93-103).
9exception was when competence was considered fundamental for a particular office, such
as the military officers and financial officials who were elected. Moreover, not all citizens
could become randomly selected officials. They had, for instance, to be at least thirty
years old. They were also subject to an assessment when selected, as well as at the end of
their respective terms of office.
It is likely that other ancient Greek city-states used similar random mechanisms to select
their politicians and public officials, but little is known about the respective rules. But
random choice is well documented for medieval Italian city-states. It played a large role,
particularly in Florence between 1328 and 1530, where the six to 12 members of the city
government (whose terms were quite short, sometimes being only of two months’
duration) were chosen by lot from the volunteers running for office. Their ability to do
the job was scrutinized by a group of aristocrats and citizens. The latter were again
selected by lot. Random mechanisms were also extensively used in other Italian city-
states, such as Bologna, Parma and Vicenza, as well as in Barcelona. It was used in
Venice until the city’s independence was terminated by Napoleon in 1797. The selection
process for the doge was very complex and, at each stage, involved random elements (see
Knag 1998). First, 30 members of the Great Council, composed of several hundred
members, were selected randomly and then reduced to nine by another draw. These
persons elected a new group of 40, which in turn were reduced to 12 by yet another draw.
These 12 persons in turn elected a new group of 25, which was again reduced by a
random mechanism to nine. This was repeated several times. Only then did a group of 41,
none of whom could have been chosen previously, elect the doge. In the 1900s in San
Marino, a similar procedure was used to select the state’s two governors from the 60-
member council (Carson and Martin 1999: 33).
B. Advantages and Disadvantages of the Random Mechanism
As is true for all social decision-making mechanisms, random selection has its strengths
and weaknesses. Only the most important ones are mentioned here (for a fuller discussion
see Carson and Martin 1999: 34-38; Elster 1989:103-122).
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Major advantages are:
- A random selection is fair in the sense that every person gets an equal chance of
being selected10. If the random mechanism is correctly applied, no other
consideration, such as income, status or political connections plays any role.
- The selection is totally representative as, after a number of draws, the persons
chosen exactly reflect the underlying population of voters. No particular gender,
race, religion or any other group is favored.
- Decisions by lot are easy to undertake and are universally applicable. A common
method of deciding between two issues is to toss a coin. When there are more
issues involved, balls are put into an urn, and then one or more balls are selected
either mechanically or by a person (these procedures are well known from lotteries,
and are regularly shown on TV).
There are also important actual or presumed disadvantages:
- The random method seems to lack “rationality”, in the sense that no reason for a
particular choice is given. But individuals seem to have an innate need to attribute a
reason to a certain choice. Having no reason for a selection leaves a feeling of
dissatisfaction. The interpretation of random mechanisms being aimless, haphazard
and indifferent derives from this.
- The persons chosen tend to have a reduced obligation to take the task they are
chosen for seriously. Exactly because they are chosen indiscriminately, they can
hardly pride themselves on having been selected because of their intelligence,
dedication, efficiency or knowledge. As a result, the intrinsic motivation to perform
well might be reduced (this is a kind of “crowding-out effect”, see Frey 1997b).
While this argument rings true, it is of lesser importance in reality than one might
expect. Even purely randomly selected persons, after a short time, tend to attribute
positive features to themselves, once they have been selected. At least, to some
                                                 
10 This holds, of course, only for draws with equal probabilities, which are the rule. But it is easily
possible to assign a person, or group of persons, more weight, e.g. they are given two times or
three times as much weight. But the argument continues in the sense that no other considerations
enter into the matter.
11
extent, they believe that their choice has been “god’s will” (an aspect crucial in
Athenian democracy, see Elster 1989:50-52) or, in a secularized society, that it at
least has some unknown deeper meaning behind it.
These advantages and disadvantages should not be considered in isolation. They need to
be compared to the advantages and disadvantages any other social decision making
system has (following a comparative institutional analysis). This paper argues that the
advantages of random selection are particularly strong for the selection of representative
citizens to overview international organizations. While the disadvantages certainly cannot
be dismissed, they are in this particular application reckoned to be of minor importance
compared to the disadvantages of using other social decision-making mechanisms.
C. Proposals Using Random Selection
In the scholarly literature, many suggestions have been made to use random mechanisms
for social decision-making because of their attractive features. It is sufficient to refer to
some examples that are directly relevant for the proposal advanced here.
Random dictator. Out of the total electorate, one person is chosen by lot to act as a
dictator for a specified period of time. This proposal seems to be rather awkward, but
there are some good arguments in its favor (Elster 1989: 86-91). Random election is the
only system not making it in the peoples’ interest to misrepresent their preferences, in
particular by appearing to be more honest and less egoistic than they in fact are. In
contrast, all elections provide an incentive to the contenders to present a too favorable
image of themselves to the voters. Another advantage is that the institution of a random
dictator selects an “ordinary”, representative, member of the citizenry, and thus prevents
professional politicians with their special interests taking over. These advantages are also
directly relevant for the random selection of citizens in charge of international
organizations.
The institution of a random dictator also has some obvious disadvantages. The persons
chosen as temporal dictators have no opportunity to learn from experience. The public
bureaucracy, with its long and extensive experience, tends to accumulate considerable
power and, when taken to the extreme, can dominate the citizens selected. In contrast to
selection by lot, regular elections and re-elections have the advantage of making the
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incumbents accountable to the voters. As was already taken into account in the classical
Athenian democracy, random selection is inefficient in those areas of governance where
the office holders have to exhibit special competence.
Probability Voting. Random selection can be combined with voting on issues. In the
simple case of there being two alternatives, a vote is taken and the winner is then
determined by using a random mechanism, whereby alternatives are attributed
probabilities according to the percentage of votes they received. If alternative A receives
70% of the votes (and seven red balls), and B 30% (and three blue balls), then alternative
A is chosen if e.g. a random draw from a receptacle with the ten balls results in the
selection of a red ball. If a blue ball is randomly drawn, alternative B is the winner (Frey
1969, Intriligator 1973).
Voting by Veto. In this decision-making system (Mueller 1978), each person puts forward
one alternative, and there is also the status quo alternative. In each round of voting, one
voter can veto one of the alternatives. The sequence in which the voters can act in this
way is determined by lot. Whichever alternative remains, i.e. is not vetoed by anyone, is
the winner.
Random Selection in a Representative Democracy. From the voting populace, a random
sample is chosen to form a national legislature (Mueller, Tollison and Willett 1972).
Selection is through stratified sampling in order to ensure the representation of people
with certain characteristics, as well as to prevent the overrepresentation of minority
preferences. There is no stratified geographic sampling, as one goal of the proposal is to
overcome pork barrel activities.
D. Institutional Design of Direct Democracy with Randomly Selected Voters
for International Organizations
Existing international organizations are often anything but democratic. They are to a large
extent run by diplomats and politicians who are appointed in what is often an obscure
way. They are far from being democratically legitimized. Public officials, who were
brought in from national bureaucracies, or who have risen within the ranks of the
organization itself, also have a large say. The deliberations preceding decisions (with
only a few exceptions) remain with this elite, and are concealed from the public. These
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conditions, and others, have been strongly criticized by an insider, who acted as chief
economist and vice-president of the World Bank (Stiglitz 2002). Moreover, many
international organizations are plagued by huge inefficiencies11. One of the main purposes
of the institutional design must therefore be to make the international organizations more
democratic and to subject them to outside control by persons who are not a part of the
elite running these institutions. We propose international governance to adopt direct
citizen participation rights and to randomly select voters deciding on international public
affairs.
Institutional design of voting with random selection
Basis of Representation. A selection corresponding most closely to the standard
understanding of democracy assigns equal weight to each citizen of the member states. In
that case,  the larger a country’s population is, the greater its influence. However, an
alternative possibility would  be to assign the number of selected voters according to
financial contributions (as in the case of the World Bank and the International Monetary
Fund), or to select an equal number in each country (similar to the one country one vote
rule in the UN General Assembly). Which assignment is chosen depends on a large
number of factors. If, for instance, small member countries want to be protected from
potential exploitation, the same number of citizens can be selected from each country to
decide on referendums.
Voting mechanism.12 After the selected citizens have voted, a set of different decision
rules is possible. Simple majority is a natural starting point. However, the status quo
representing at least a past social consensus might be protected with the requirement of a
qualified majority. In order to protect minority interests, it would also be possible to
                                                 
11 This is, or was, e.g., the case for many institutions of the United Nations, such as UNESCO.
The UN financial institutions (International Monetary Fund and World Bank) are less inefficient,
mainly because the voting rights are distributed according to the financial commitments. This
provides the main nations financing these organizations with an incentive to prevent large-scale
inefficiency (Frey 1984, Frey and Gygi 1990).
12 We do not discuss different technically possible voting mechanisms, like e-voting, here. The
organization of the vote is left to the individual member countries. We do not propagate e-voting
in our proposal, because security issues with e-voting have not yet been dealt with sufficiently. It
is probably far easier to manipulate e-voting than voting at the ballot box. Moreover, the
transaction costs of voting are probably a minor determinant of the quality of decisions.
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demand double majority, i.e. a majority of votes, as well as a majority of countries that
approve a proposal.
Conditions of selection. Most importantly, the term in office has to be decided. The
shorter the term, the larger the number of preferences represented via random selection.
But this has the disadvantage that the selected citizens are less capable of getting
informed about the activities of the particular international organization. The more
important experience and factual knowledge are, the longer the term should be.
A selected citizen may be associated to one particular international organization or to
various international organizations. The more similar the activities of international
organizations are, the more sense it makes to select voters serving for various
organizations.
Anonymity. The identity of the selected citizens can be made public or can be kept secret.
Publicity enables other citizens to make their concerns felt to their selected fellow
citizens, but also gives pressure groups the possibility of influencing them, putting non-
organized groups at a disadvantage (Olson 1965). In many cases, the pressure exerted by
the national governments is even more relevant. However, as the national administrations
apply the random selection mechanism and have to publicise which citizens have been
selected, the identity of the representatives cannot be hidden from the national
governments. In view of this, there is much to be said for making the identity of the
representatives known. Rules may be introduced limiting the undue influence of pressure
groups. In particular, both active and passive corruption must be punished.
Institutional design of citizens’ participation rights
The citizens selected by lot can exercise their rights in two different ways:
(1) They can initiate votes on issues of content (initiatives) or on people (recall). Both
a successfully launched initiative and a recall force the managers of the
international organization concerned to hold a vote among all the citizens selected.
Whether such votes are frequent or rare is to a large extent determined by the
signature requirement. The signature requirement can be defined as a total minimal
number across nations. However, it can also include minimal numbers of signatures
within a percentage of countries, or restrictions for the maximum duration of time
15
between the point of time an initiative/recall is announced and the point of time the
signatures are deposited.13
(2) They can vote in a mandatory referendum applicable to major issues, such as
changes in the ground rules (the constitution) of the international organization.
The content of initiatives is not restricted. However, proposals are made for changes in
the constitution of an international organization. Recall of the management of
international organizations can be applied to politicians and public officials. Assigning a
signature quorum faces a trade-off. The lower the quorum is, the larger the uncertainty
among the managers, inducing them to take a short-term view. The higher the quorum is,
the stronger is the position of the managers. The less discretionary room the managers
have, the less threatening is such management power to the interests of the citizens in the
member states. In some cases, the tasks of the international organizations are so precisely
defined that the managers are severely restricted. If that happens, the quorum for recall
can well be high. In other cases, the managers are, to a large extent, able to determine the
organization’s activities by themselves, in which case a stricter restriction on the threat of
recall is desirable.
III. Strengths and Weaknesses
Selecting voters randomly from the population of citizens of the member countries
belonging to an international organization has several important advantages over other
ways of approaching the issue.
The most important is the strengthening of democratic control by the citizens. The
democracy deficit now characterizing international organizations is overcome by giving
citizens direct participation rights. As it would be complicated and time consuming to ask
for everybody’s vote, a representative group of citizens is randomly selected. These
selected citizens have considerable power through the use of initiatives, referendums and
                                                 
13 Alternatively, signing an initiative or a recall can be allowed to every citizen, whether selected
or not. In this case, signature requirements should be substantially increased.
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recall. This enables them to not only react to what the management of the international
organizations proposes, but also to exert agenda setting power14.
The democratization of international organizations gives them a measure of legitimacy
which otherwise cannot be attained. The citizens of the member countries, aware that
they are fairly represented in the organizations’ decision-making process, are motivated
to provide international public goods, or at least to politically support their provision. An
example would be international agencies for the improvement of global environmental
goods (such as combating global warming), which are today essentially technocratic units
without much, or any, democratic basis. They act far removed from the citizens. In a
system of randomly selected voters connected to such organizations, the citizens in the
various member countries start to feel an incentive and obligation to participate in the
joint effort. An important route is the general discussion generated among the citizens,
whether they are selected or not.15 On the one hand, the citizens are informed by NGOs
(mostly via the mass media, in particular TV and radio). On the other hand, the citizens
have an incentive to involve their representatives in discussions about the issues to be
decided by the respective international organization. The public discourse from the grass
root level, as well as from specialists, serves to strengthen the willingness to participate in
the provision of international public goods16.
Another important advantage of direct participation rights by the citizens is their bundling
of decentralized information from below about the possibilities and constraints of the
international organizations’ activities. This information is less filtered and distorted than
that coming from the organizations’ bureaucracy, which tends to be biased by strategic
considerations.
                                                 
14 The crucial importance of agenda setting is discussed in McKelvey (1976) and Romer and
Rosenthal (1978).
15 For the role of political discourse in multilateral organizations, see Verweij and Josling (2003).
16 See the experimental results with public goods games, demonstrating that pre-play
communication, and even solely identification of the persons involved, strongly raises the
willingness to contribute to the provision of public goods. See Bohnet and Frey (1999) and the
extensive survey by Sally (1995). A cross-section econometric analysis for Swiss cantons
suggests that the more extensive the citizens’ direct participation rights are, the higher tax morale
is, and therefore the lower tax evasion is (Pommerehne and Weck 1996, Frey 1997a). See also
Torgler (2003).
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Recall, but also initiatives and referendums, are an effective means of controlling the
management of the international organizations. This power can be exerted via the
selected citizens and also by non-governmental organizations. They gain institutionalized
access to making their demands heard. They are less induced, or even compelled, to go
out on the streets and resort to violent action. Moreover, those non-state actors claiming
to be the voice of the people have to convince selected citizens as they gain relatively
more influence.
Finally, decisions on international agreements taken by the citizenry gain substantial
legitimacy. It becomes costly for single governments of member countries to step back
due to short-term interests, although no direct enforcement of the agreements is possible.
Not sticking to these agreements cannot easily be justified by too high costs for the
population, if a majority of selected citizens actually approved them.
As has already been pointed out, all social decision-making systems have disadvantages.
This also holds for the random selection of citizens, who have extended democratic
participation rights in international organizations. But, as will be argued, many of these
shortcomings are not as serious as they initially appear to be.
It may be argued that randomly selected citizens do not have the skills necessary to
decide in a reasonable and effective way on the constitutional matters of international
organizations. By definition, the selected citizens only have average education and may
therefore be perceived to be ill prepared for the task. This argument goes to the roots of
political decision-making. Democracy is based on the principle that the citizens, on
average, are capable of making political decisions in a reasonable way. They have one
great advantage over professional politicians and bureaucrats: they know their own
preferences better and are therefore able to express them better politically. Moreover,
there is the fundamental principal-agent problem in politics: the professional politicians
should act in the interests of their principals, the citizens, but they only have limited
incentives to do so. In a representative democracy, the professional politicians are
responsive to the citizens’ preferences, especially at election time. Empirical evidence
demonstrates that, at other times, the actions undertaken by the professional politicians
deviate substantially from the citizen’s wishes.17 In the extreme, the politicians “exploit”
                                                 
17 See, e.g., the evidence on political business cycles in Frey (1997c) and Mueller (2003, part IV).
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the voters by pursuing policies according to their personal or party ideologies, follow the
interests of well-organized and financially well-endowed pressure groups, or decide in
their own favor (see Brennan and Buchanan 1980, 1985). For instance, they accord
themselves special privileges (e.g. immunity from laws) or material benefits (such as
generous compensations and pensions, sumptuous expense accounts, cars and planes at
their free disposal). With direct participation rights of the citizens, these problems do not
arise or, if they do arise, to a much lesser extent. Econometric studies have been able to
show that citizens can make well-reasoned political decisions. Indeed, the more extensive
citizens’ direct participation rights are, the better is the public economy run. For instance,
the relationship between public expenditures and revenue is better controlled, so that the
public debt per head is lower. It has also been shown that per capita income is higher
because the public sector is better run, and that even self-reported subjective well-being is
higher18.
A related argument claims that randomly selected citizens are not well enough informed
and are therefore at the mercy of bureaucrats. First of all, it must be said that the same
applies even to professional politicians; the public officials always have more information
at their disposal, because they have often been in charge of particular issues for a much
longer period of time. It should also be noted that the randomly selected citizens tend to
rise to the challenge and can collect the information necessary for making reasoned
decisions. Such information need not be very detailed: what matters are the fundamental
issues to be decided on. Citizens need to be able to draw on the knowledge of experts,
whose job it is to provide detailed information. Moreover, empirical evidence shows that
it would be a mistake to take the present level of information about the issues related to
international organizations as a constant. Rather, the amount of information consumed is
endogenously determined and is higher when citizens have more extensive political rights
(Benz and Stutzer 2004). It can thus be expected that the randomly chosen citizens are
capable and willing to learn the information necessary to perform their task adequately.
It may also be claimed that the randomly chosen representatives have little incentive to
participate in the international organization’s decision making that they are assigned to.
                                                 
18 See Kirchgässner, Feld and Savioz (1999) and Frey and Stutzer (2000), as well as the literature
mentioned in footnote 5.
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But a high participation rate should not be taken as a value in itself. What matters is that
the selected citizens participate in the initiatives, referendums and recalls when important
issues are at stake. Such behavior provides clear signals to the international
organizations’ management that they are effectively controlled by the citizens and cannot
simply do what is in their own interests. Most people will consider it an honor to be
selected as a citizen with actual voting rights to an international organization,  and will
therefore have an incentive to participate.
Quite a different argument questions whether the people perceive the random selection of
a group of citizens to be fair. In the private realm, there is indeed considerable resistance
to random decisions. Several studies analyzed the allocation of private goods in situations
of shortage. In a survey among the population, the use of a random decision mechanism
has been considered to be less fair than alternative social decision-making mechanism
such as “first-come, first-served”, an allocation by the commune, or even than the use of
the price system (Frey and Pommerehne 1993, see also Wortman and Rabinowitz 1979,
Erez 1985). Such resistance where rationing is concerned certainly has to be taken into
account. However, in the public sphere, resistance can probably be overcome by showing
the citizens the advantages of random selection, in particular the guarantee that every
citizen is treated equally. People can also be informed that random systems are used, and
generally accepted, in many areas relating to their personal lives as, for instance, in the
hugely popular national lotteries, where the mechanism used is extensively shown at
prime TV time.
A final argument relates to the situation in an organization’s member countries with little
or no democratic traditions. While the random mechanism can probably be controlled
from outside, this is less likely to be the case for the underlying list of the electorate, and
the communication of who has been selected. But, most importantly, the selected citizens
in such a country will be induced, or forced directly, to follow the will of the country’s
government. This is unfortunate, but our proposal does not claim to be able to transform
non-democratic governments into democratic governments. If, indeed, the representatives
are forced to act as government pawns, the situation is no worse than today, where the
delegates of international organizations are directly selected by the respective non-
democratic governments. However, the random selection of citizens may even give them
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a measure of independence with respect to their own government, not least because they
decide jointly with selected citizens in democratic countries. Such joint experiences may
(under the most favorable conditions) even initiate a step towards democratization (Sen
1999).
IV. Comparison to Other Proposals
We have already argued that a global government19 is undesirable, inefficient and
utopian. It need not be further discussed here.
A less extreme idea is to enlarge and improve on the existing United Nations20. As it
exists at present, this dominant international organization has certainly been a power for
the good. It has been able to supply important international public goods, which would
probably not have come about without its existence. But the United Nations is also faced
with major problems. Most importantly, it is not democratic in the sense that there is no
direct relationship to the citizens of the countries for whose interests the UN claims to
work. Many parts of the UN system are characterized by large-scale inefficiencies with
international bureaucracies acting mainly in their own interests, and sometimes in favor
of their own material benefits. The main political decision-making body of the UN, the
Security Council, is dominated by its five permanent members, and especially by the
interests of the United States of America. It can hardly be said to act in the interests of
mankind in any meaningful sense. What is completely missing is the voice of the citizens
as compared to the large number of professional politicians, diplomats, experts and public
officials engaged. Our proposal of introducing direct participation of the citizens via
random selection may be applied to the United Nations system, with its many
organizations (see section V). It can be seen as a contribution to improving the working
of this system, but it is not confined to it.
                                                 
19 See, e.g., the proposals by Archibugi et al. (2000), Falk and Strauss (2001), Höffe (1999) or
Galtung (2000).
20 There have been many suggestions to reform the United Nations (see, e.g., Bertrand 1997 and
for overviews Ghebali 1997 and Hüfner and Martens 2000). The latest report on the United
Nations and collective security comes from a panel set up by the secretary-general of the United
Nations, Kofi Annan (2004).
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Another proposal for the improvement of international relations seeks to integrate the
non-state actors into the decision-making process, most importantly the International Non
Governmental Organizations (INGOs), the transnational corporations or Business NGOs
(BINGOs). Their number is estimated to be no less than 25,000 today, while in the 50s it
was 1,000 (Keohane and Nye 2000, Arts 2003). This system is based on bargaining
among these organized groups. It has the following problems:
- Many important interests are not organized in any effective way and are not part of
this bargaining system. They also lose out compared to the well-organized
international NGOs.
- The INGOs are not democratically legitimized; there is no established relationship
to the citizens.
- The outcomes of bargaining are uncertain and tend to be in favor of the moneyed
interests. While the ‘logrolling’ taking place tends to lead to Pareto-superior
outcomes for those in the winning coalition, those groups which are not a part of it
tend to lose out.
- Many INGOs are inefficient and wasteful. It has therefore been suggested that there
is a great need to subject them to auditing (The Economist Sept. 20th, 2003).
Yet another proposal for improving global governance is to give more importance to
experts. They can be organized in groups in order to increase the amount of media
attention they get. This is the road pursued, for instance, by the Club of Rome, the World
Economic Forum, or the Copenhagen Consensus. With the expansion of Internet, there
are increasingly informal international networks. Such initiatives are well suited to make
the views of specialists and/or highly engaged persons heard, but they are not
democratically legitimized. They thus do not meet a crucial element of our own proposal.
Another new way of organizing global governance is the idea of Functional, Overlapping,
Competing Jurisdictions (FOCJ).21 It supports the emergence of new governmental units
                                                 
21 See, more fully, Frey and Eichenberger (1999) and Eichenberger and Frey (2002), and the
critical discussion by Vanberg (2000) and Blatter and Ingram (2000). FOCJ seem to be able to
solve the trilemma discussed by Rodrik (2000), as they are able to align governmental
jurisdictions with markets (but it should be noted that Rodrik envisages a World Government).
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according to the needs arising. The geographical size of FOCJ are established according
to the functional needs, and therefore differ greatly between areas. Some FOCJ will be
very large and even cover the whole world (for instance, in the case of global warming or
the regulation of outer space), but they may also be very small (for instance, in the case of
local public goods, such as sanitation). FOCJ are not part of the nation-state; rather they
tend to overlap each other. When they exist and grow in importance, the traditional
nation-states will be reduced to those functions they are more efficiently providing than a
newly emerging functional unit. FOCJ are conceived to be democratic. They can take
recourse to random selection in order to ensure that the citizens can effectively make their
demands known and control the management. FOCJ are thus consistent with the ideas
proposed here.
V. Application to the United Nations
The United Nations (UN) is in a crisis. Many of the alleged grievances are not new and
include bureaucratic slowness, ineffectiveness and even corruption. More fundamental is
the UN’s incapacity to reform itself and to change its ground rules in order to fulfill its
mission that is to “save succeeding generations from the scourge of war”. A prime
deadlock lies in the anachronistic Security Council. Out of its 15 members, five
permanent members (the four main victors in the second world war – the United States,
Russia, Great Britain and China – plus France) have veto power in all of the important
UN decisions (including the composition of the Security Council itself). This distribution
of power in the UN is not at all representative of the reality of international politics today,
nor is it in any sense democratic. As a consequence, UN decisions – or more often non-
decisions – lose legitimacy and the UN is far from being the moral authority it needs to
be in order to successfully protect freedom and support democratic nation building. The
deadlock is probably not only due to the privileged position of the permanent members. It
is also the challengers’ policy that contributes to the deadlock, and thus undermines the
UN’s authority.22
                                                 
22 On the one side, Germany, Brazil, India and Japan are supporting each other for a permanent
seat in the Security Council while, on the other side, there are opponents to an enlargement
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According to our proposal, citizens would have the right to initiate an amendment to the
UN charter and thus set the agenda. This would allow the people to break the deadlock
that is endangering a potentially great institution. Citizens interested in peace – rather
than politicians involved in local rivalries with neighboring nations for seats in the
Council – could collect signatures for a proposal. The proposal’s content is not restricted
and could, for example, comprise a rotating Security Council, making decisions based on
a qualified majority and being accountable to the remaining UN member countries. The
UN would then arrange a vote in which all selected citizens in the member countries
could participate. If the initiative were to be approved in a majority of countries and by a
majority of voters, the proposed amendment would become binding for the UN.
VI. Concluding Remarks
World governance today is characterized by international organizations short of
democratic legitimacy. Professional politicians, diplomats, experts and public officials
determine their behavior without much, or any, control by the citizens they claim to
represent. As a consequence, international organizations have become the object of large
scale and violent protests. At the same time, international organizations are criticized as
being inefficient and wasteful.
This paper proposes an approach to world governance based on the democratic idea of
citizen participation: From the citizenry of the member countries of an international
organization, a random selection of people would be chosen to have the actual right to
participate in international organization decision-making via initiatives, referendums and
recalls. While this proposal would fundamentally change world governance compared to
today, it would be restricted to improving the working of international organizations. The
objective is to aim for four major improvements: First, selected citizens’ access to
initiatives, referendums, and recalls would give them effective means with which to
control executive politicians and public officials in international organizations and thus
reduce inefficiencies. Second, the introduction of direct democratic mechanisms for
decision-making would give NGOs a constitutional instrument to pursue their goals.
                                                                                                                                                  
because they do not want their neighboring country to have more power. The latter group
includes Italy, Spain, Pakistan, South Korea, Argentina and Mexico.
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However, it would also force them to use procedures provided by law and would thus
weaken them relative to latent groups (like taxpayers), which would be empowered.
Third, international organizations would be connected to the people on behalf of whose
interests they are expected to act. This would give citizens back some of the autonomy
and self-determination they enjoy in democracy. Fourth, decisions in international
organizations, which are approved by randomly selected citizens, would gain legitimacy
and would be more likely to obtain acceptance (even if they are against the short term
interests of national governments). This would be important due to the almost complete
lack of direct enforcement mechanisms in the international realm.
The proposal is certainly in a preliminary stage and many aspects need further
consideration. But one thing can be predicted with certainty: The decision-makers in
international organizations and national governments will reject it. While the basic thrust
of an increased democratic element is difficult to deny, the proposal will be labeled naïve
and impossible to realize. But such a reaction would correspond exactly to the interests of
these decision-makers. They know that introducing randomly selected citizens would
reduce their discretionary power and importance. It would therefore be in their interests
to find as many arguments against the proposal as possible. Quite another strategy would
be to simply ignore the proposal. In any case, the entrenched persons and groups will not
support it. But this does not necessarily mean that it will never be put into practice, at
least for some particular international organizations.
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